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INTRODUCTION 
It seems politics invades everything. We can rarely think of any activity, any building, 
any human-to-human interaction and not see some political dimension infiltrating and shaping 
it. And this very interpretation, in its language of invasion and infiltration, implies that politics’ 
ubiquity is not necessarily a wanted accomplice in our human world. Nonetheless, its presence 
is expected, its strategic intentions acknowledged and negotiated. 
What is interesting is that persona—at least as it has been explored and defined in 
Persona Studies so far—always has a political dimension. It has been identified as a strategic 
identity, a form of negotiation of the individual in their foray into a collective world of the social 
(Marshall and Barbour). Persona is a fabricated reconstruction of the individual that is used to 
play a role that both helps the individual navigate their presence and interactions with others 
and helps the collective to position the role of the individual in the social. Persona is imbued 
with politics at its core. 
In this issue of Persona Studies, we explore political persona, a characterisation roiled in 
redundancy if our definitions above are adopted. The essays gathered in this collection debate 
these definitional affinities, and augment and nuance many other dimensions that help delineate 
what constitutes political persona. In this introductory essay, we will use the collected work on 
political persona that is developed in this issue to better define political persona. But before we 
evaluate and identify the intersections of our contributors’ work, we want to begin our 
exploration with what makes political persona constitutively different today than in the past. 
Can we identify through some of the most prominent political personas—Donald Trump, Hillary 
Clinton, and Bernie Sanders in the United States’ 2016 Presidential campaign, for example—and 
through a study of a major political event—Brexit in 2016 in the U.K.—whether something has 
shifted and changed in these cultures? 
So here is our opening premise before we explore these political personas and political 
events, before we work out how Trump emerged and triumphed or how Brexit happened. First, 
that the changed media environment we now inhabit is producing a new, unstable political 
environment. This alone is an incredibly grand—perhaps technological determinist —claim. 
Nonetheless it is a claim that is linked to very visible transformations transnationally in our 
media production and media use. To particularise this further, central to this instability is the 
massive mediatisation of the self through the integration of online culture into everyday life. 
What we would like to claim is this: persona is a way to explore and investigate this shift and 
moment of instability, both in the way it operated in the past as a mediatised identity, and the 
way it is now pandemic and pervasive as a way of being in contemporary culture. What is 
emerging in our political cultures is a new competition between what we call a representational 
media and cultural regime—where the systems of representation and the array of individuals 
privileged in both politics and media are relatively stable and mutually legitimising—and the 
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emerging presentational media and cultural regime—where the pervasive mediatised and public 
self and its online performance, networking and sharing, operates as a complex filter for both 
the organisation and meaning of politics and culture.  
To make this claim that there is some tectonic shift in our cultures, and that this 
particular tool of persona research can in some way elucidate how it has occurred and how to 
comprehend some of its future directions and manifestations, it is important for us to identify 
political persona more completely. So our first step in this introductory essay is to ask what 
kinds of ideas inform the concept of political persona. How is political persona connected to pre-
existing fields and disciplines? From that basis, we might be able to discern the particular and 
peculiar dimensions of contemporary political persona that have led to some of the strangest 
political campaigns to emerge in the United States and the United Kingdom—and, as some of 
our articles in this special issue identify, well beyond these settings—in 2016. 
POLITICAL PERSONA RESEARCH TO DATE 
Research that specifically identifies political personas is quite recent. In political 
communication, there has been some exploration related to persona around authenticity and 
image. For instance, one of the most interesting studies tried to determine the relationship 
between the performances of the public persona and private persona of two American 
presidents (Sigelman). Through a comparison of public speeches and what Richard Nixon and 
Lyndon Baines Johnson actually said in the White House in private conversations, Sigelman was 
able to ascertain that, with a few exceptions (particularly around profanity) their speech 
patterns were similar. However, after Nixon’s collapse through the Watergate scandal, which 
was exacerbated by the blatant and sometimes tampered-with private conversations, no future 
presidents recorded their private conversations for posterity, and thus no new research has 
advanced to determine these different registers that politicians employ. Nonetheless, this 
research underlines that there are different registers of performance and that further analysis 
of this separation of identities into strategic personas needs to be explored and developed. A 
politician structures a distinct identity in these different registers: a television interview, for 
instance, is a different constitution of persona than a televised speech, despite the use of the 
same technology of communication. And we can readily observe how current politicians use 
different registers of performance between their online Twitter posts and their political rally 
speeches. 
Other research in political communication has investigated whether there is a 
recognisable difference between a politician’s persona and their position on issues (Hacker et 
al.). Persona, in this research, is clearly identified with a candidate’s image as it is perceived by 
the electorate. Through a survey of issues and perceived image of Bob Dole and Bill Clinton in 
1996, Hacker et al. discovered that there was a high correlation between their perceived 
persona and the issues represented—a finding contrary to assumed understanding that image 
and issue were separate and distinct in politics (233-234).  
Another research trajectory that provides an understanding of political persona has 
emerged from the study of politics and its peculiar transformations through contemporary 
media. John Corner began developing the idea of how the political persona was a mediated 
entity and how strategically politicians worked and performed within the exigencies of that 
particular arena. Building from Machiavelli and paralleling the current research in Persona 
Studies, Corner explains that politicians work towards particular ends via the tools and 
techniques that allow for the expression and articulation of power, “playing off the ‘outer’ [self] 
against the ‘inner’ [self]” (387). Corner’s analysis directly builds on Goffman’s work on the 
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presentation of the self. Furthermore, Corner’s insight is expanded in his subsequent work with 
Pels, with their research including a further focus on an aspect of contemporary politics that has 
some resonance with the current Trump campaign of 2016: that is, the blending of 
entertainment values with political values in the mediatised representation of politicians (Pels 
and Corner). This perceived migration of politics into the realm of entertainment was the 
trajectory of some of the original research into celebrity culture (Marshall, Celebrity and Power 
203-247) and has led to extensive literature that deals with celebrity and politics that Mark 
Wheeler has pulled together in his recent book Celebrity Politics: Image and Identity in 
Contemporary Political Communications.  
Much of the research on politics and celebrity has a direct value to the constitution of 
political persona. Research, such as John Street’s work on categorising celebrity politics and 
political activity, can be usefully applied to various forms of negotiated public identity that 
express the notion of political persona and its sometime dependence, liaisons with, and 
appropriations from other forms of identity that are predominantly connected to the world of 
entertainment (Street 435-52). The extensive work on celebrity activism, where celebrities 
become associated with particular causes, has also served to underline the moving constellation 
of what constitutes politics and who can be thought of as a political persona (Tsaliki; Fridell and 
Konings). It is now surprisingly commonplace to see figures such as Bono, from the rock group 
U2, comfortable at summits. Similarly, Angelina Jolie has become a legitimate presence within 
the UN, the American Council on Foreign Relations, and the London School of Economics 
(Totman). Part of this capacity of celebrities to move across fields of activity is connected to the 
way that politics and its public display are seen synergistically with these wider dimensions of 
performance. Although not identical, a successful politician often has to have the same 
mediatising abilities to attract attention, to express emotion, and to build audiences as followers 
as a leading actor or popular music performer must do. And it is interesting that several of our 
contributors in this issue have explored the link between politics and cultural forms such as film 
and popular music.  
These qualities of political persona can be collectively understood as processes of 
mediatisation, broadly conceived and reconfigured into political practice, staging and, perhaps 
most specifically and visibly, in election campaigning. Although mediatisation of the public self 
is differently constituted in different political contexts and ecologies, over the course of the 
twentieth century it has converged towards a much more commodified identity. Part of this 
transformation of the politician into a commodity is related to the way advertising and 
promotion has become a shorthand of political messaging specifically in democratic election 
campaigns. 
The commodified political persona has been most thoroughly explored when it has been 
linked to political marketing. In that particular research context, persona becomes close-to-
synonymous with the brand. Brand identity simultaneously generates and depends on the 
emotional connection between the politician and the voter, and thus works in the space that can 
be thought of as the territory of persona. In Persona Studies, persona can be thought of as 
neither individual nor collective, but rather the way the individual negotiates their move into 
the collective and the way that the collective interprets this now organised individual entity. 
From its corporate legacy when it began to be employed with serious intention in the late 
nineteenth century, a brand was meant to contain the value of the product through its 
consistency and its readily identifiable form (Moor 26). The brand was the embodiment of the 
corporate ethic and integrity and its array of products. With simple variations and consistencies 
in design, the brand clearly differentiated one product from other products in the marketplace.  
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In politics’ reconfiguration into political brands attached to individual leaders, 
professional practitioners working in campaigns have advanced on research that identifies the 
kinds of “affinities” that can be established between an electorate and a leader. As Cwalina and 
Falkowski underline, political brands have some qualities that make them “fuzzier” or more 
openly defined than product brands precisely because of the human dimension of politicians 
(Hampson and Goldberg, cited in Cwalina and Falkowski 156). In their reading of political 
brands, they identify two “basic aspects” that are reconfigured somewhat by the political: 
“brand awareness and brand image” (156). In their research on the Polish Presidential election 
of 2005, Cwalina and Falkowski claim that the real work of political marketing is to 
simultaneously blend positive associations with the political leader and mitigate negative 
associations so that the political brand image is best connected to the electorate most likely to 
vote for a given candidate. Their research recognises that the political leader is perceived 
differently by different demographics, and thus there is a need to make the “associative 
affinity”match with the way that politics is actually thought of by different groups (161).  
In related research, Speed, Butler and Collins emphasise the “human” element of the 
political brand scene (129). In its adaptation of approaches from business marketing, political 
marketing has to identify the “product” more clearly and thereby formulate the “political offer” 
that is conveyed to the electorate (129). The personal dimension of politics is central, as it 
becomes the way that parties and policies are made real and realisable, and this close affinity to 
the personality is the critical difference in politics. The objective, then, is to translate and link 
party to leader and electorate to leader, where the human element of the leader’s brand is not 
just an endorser of a position like a celebrity endorsing a product, but is what they call an 
“organizational actor” (145). Because of this potential “human” brand dimension, a focus on 
establishing the “authenticity” of the leader’s message is critical to both party and elections 
(147). 
In a very direct way, what is evident from this research is that political marketing is 
devoted to the construction of strategic public identities—personas—that can be deployed for 
political agendas and outcomes. The objective of blending image and associations, of 
authenticity with authority and organisational identity in political marketing is to build the 
identities so that they function effectively and win elections. This research on political brands 
and the field of political marketing also reveals the way that the “personal” figures so largely in 
how politics is both conveyed and sold. The personalisation of politics is often configured as a 
threat to “real” issues; emerging from leadership studies, personalisation is perceived as a move 
away from rational decision-making into emotional associations (Garzia). Joshua Meyrowitz 
provocatively claimed in 1985 that leaders had lost their aura via the blanket and microscopic 
coverage by the media (cited in Garzia) and this has led to the further expansion of the 
personalisation of politics. Poguntke and Webb have linked this shift in international politics to 
all countries—even those without presidential and republican systems of government—and 
found their political forms of promotion have become progressively more “presidentialized” 
where the entire political system is focused on the singularity of leadership that the presidential 
system expresses (3).  
Partially emerging from a similar understanding of the personalisation of politics has 
been research that has worked to understand the increasing move to affect in politics. For 
Jessica Evans, the “mediated persona” is derived from celebrity and its discourse of “intimacy, 
confession and revelation” (73). Our connection to politics becomes “parasocial”, as if the 
electorate know the politician (74-75). Evans’ “psychosocial” approach explains this move to the 
personal as producing a dual “identity politics”: voters are drawn to politicians who resemble 
their values and attitudes and politicians reconstruct themselves as personal 
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friends/recognisable personas that can relate directly to these identities (77-78). Evans 
exemplifies the complicated nature of personalised identity politics for the female public 
persona through an analysis of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin in the 2008 US presidential and 
vice-presidential campaigns as a psychosocial problem that filled “contradictory demands” of 
public identity and performance (82). Similarly, Liesbet van Zoonen investigates the different 
way that women politicians are critiqued as they move into prominence in the political public 
sphere. The feminist adage of the “personal is political” is transformed via its political 
remediatisation and produces an identity scrutiny that continuously integrates judgements of 
beauty and femininity in a recurrent delegitimising counterpoint to expressions of power and 
authority that are somehow still seen naturally as the province of masculinity. Her analysis of 
the mediated political personas of the early career of Angela Merkel and the emergence of the 
first female Finnish Prime Minister Tarja Halonen elucidate their identities as personalised via 
the media, but their personas are arrested in their capacity to express a private and celebritised 
identity in a manner that male politicians have been able to embrace more directly. There is no 
question that a complex variation of this form of political persona still lingers in our “reading” of 
Hillary Clinton and her run for President in 2016. 
A final further area of inquiry into political persona can be seen in political biography. 
Lebow presents an interesting argument that biographers such as Caro have produced valuable 
forms of political theory in their interpretation of intentionality. Certainly, the contemporary 
political autobiography is used as a sophisticated production of legitimised public identity for 
emerging political figures. In the American context, almost all leading presidential candidates 
have produced a book to describe how their personal identity is connected to their political 
ambitions. For example, we can think here of Barack Obama’s Audacity of Hope or even JFK’s 
Profiles in Courage and its efforts to link past figures to his own desires. A similar pattern of 
strategic identity construction through autobiography is present in many other political systems 
and can serve as a useful primer for the ways that an idealised political persona can be 
constituted for strategic deployment in contemporary politics and a pathway to interrogate its 
formation. 
As is evident, political persona has been explored in many fields and directions of 
inquiry. Although not always identified fully as persona studies, these approaches—from 
political communication, mediated politics and celebrity studies, political branding in marketing 
research, leadership studies, feminist and psychosocially-derived research, and political 
biography—reveal insights into the way that persona operates in political culture. As much as 
these approaches are valuable, they are also useful in identifying what is being overlooked with 
political persona and what areas—particularly in the contemporary moment—are emerging 
that are genuinely producing some new and perhaps dangerous configurations of political 
persona. From this mapping of political persona, we now return to investigating the issue that 
emerges from our original premise: that something profound is changing our political 
landscape, and persona is one channel to investigate this shift. 
UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL PERSONA IN THE REPRESENTATIONAL MEDIA AND 
CULTURAL REGIME: THE EMERGENCE OF THE MACRO-ACTOR 
The representation of individualised political authority is not new to democracy or even 
the nation-state. There is a long history of techniques to extend the power of an individual 
beyond their physical presence—or, in other words, to produce mediated versions of a political 
persona that can operate as a form of legitimacy. Mediatisation can be understood as the 
translation or communication of a message through a technology that extends that message or 
the intentions of the messenger outwards. Research into mediatisation has looked 
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predominantly at how our contemporary world allows more of its production of meaning to be 
translated into technological forms such as television or the Internet (Lundby). One of the best 
ways to understand this early mediatisation is not through poems or songs, but through its 
instantiation through coinage. Alexander the Great was one of the first to produce a stability in 
everyday culture by ensuring that coins bore his image, albeit sometimes twinned with ram’s 
horns which worked to link his identity with the gods (Braudy). Because coinage is specifically 
designed for exchange, it linked Alexander with the most mundane activities, but specifically as 
a guarantor of value, where the coin had the assurance with his image imprinted that it was 
genuinely worth its weight identified in silver. This form of mediatisation of political leadership 
has continued ever since and can be seen in its peculiar and particular constitution through the 
living Queen Elizabeth II on coins across the Commonwealth. The Queen does not necessarily 
represent political power in its ebbs and flows of elections, but she does embody the nation and 
the security of its monetary system that transcends the change in prime ministership across the 
many countries her profile is used to guarantee monetary value. 
A useful way to unpack contemporary institutional support for select individuals’ 
political authority over people and land—and its current turbulence—is to consider Michel 
Callon and Bruno Latour’s early reading of Hobbes’ Leviathan. Callon and Latour extend a strand 
of Hobbes’ argument, in which Hobbes claims that a “person” can refer to a multitude of 
individuals if a single individual is authorised to act in the name of all (Hobbes 160), to a more 
general theory of how Leviathans (in the plural) assemble and legitimise their authority over 
micro-actors (Callon and Latour). In Hobbes’ original text, the Leviathan was the product of a 
“Covenant of every man [sic] with every man” (168) to surrender their right of self-governance 
to one single “person”: the sovereign/Leviathan. For Callon and Latour, a Leviathan arises from 
the apparatus that transforms a micro-actor into a macro-actor with extraordinary agency. 
Hobbes postulates a social contract that works to bind the social world together, where the 
sovereign/Leviathan fulfils their role of ensuring order and the people accept this macro-actor’s 
authority. Callon and Latour break with Hobbes in asserting that a Leviathan cannot be 
maintained by a social contract alone. 
In Latour’s larger project of Actor Network Theory, he points to how objects, things, and 
environments serve as forms of agencies that establish and maintain social relations (Latour). 
Callon and Latour’s interpretation of the Leviathan points to how all of these things, not just 
people, are micro-actors that are enrolled into the service of the Leviathan. There are many 
techniques that a Leviathan structures to make this seem normal and natural, and Callon and 
Latour point to these as apparatuses that hide the operation of power. The castle or the palace, 
with its intimidatingly grand architecture, works precisely to leave authority unchallenged.  
Callon and Latour use the metaphorical expression of placing particular actors/objects 
in a “black box” when their contribution to the Leviathan’s stability and power becomes “a 
matter of indifference,” such that the contingency and necessity of their contribution is no 
longer readily visible (285). In our extension of Callon and Latour we propose that, over time, 
the Leviathans constituting Western political systems of government have developed a 
naturalised relationship with—or, have put into a “black box”—the technology of distribution of 
information, news and images as they circulate for the given purposes of the organisation of 
democracy.  
The technologies we are identifying are usually collectively called the media. Even this 
characterisation of the media as unified, already has embedded, in its meaning systems, those 
structures and techniques that are hiding their practices of naturalising our relationship to what 
is significant (usually characterised as news) and who is important (identifiable characters from 
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politics and entertainment). For the last two centuries, one of media’s general practices has 
been to simplify the social in this way through image-making (broadly conceived, for it 
incorporates the image made by both text constructions and sound) around a small group of 
people in each polity and in each culture and across the transnational divides as well. 
Identifying this pattern of power as a “representational media and cultural regime” 
(Marshall “Presentation of the Self”; Marshall “Mapping”) captures the way that our systems of 
political and cultural representation have been closely linked to our media systems, a 
relationship that has been building and normalising over the last two centuries. Employing 
Callon and Latour’s notion of macro-actors, putting into “black boxes” the technology of media 
and the connected audiences that they produce with regularity, an odd but powerful paradox 
becomes apparent: media make certain people highly visible to a point that they become 
naturalised as legitimately representative of the populace across the domains of politics and 
culture, but the media are also making invisible their “social” work in constructing a coherent 
system of representation. In this essay, we are opening up this “black box” (Callon and Latour) 
by pointing to the way that the media work to both construct and make at least part of the social 
and political negotiation patterned and predictable. The array of leaders in a democracy—the 
visible faces of our contemporary Leviathans—are regularly simplified to a recognisable range 
and number through this highly visible process that is invisibly connected to the organisation of 
power. 
This representational media and cultural regime has built through the development and 
increasing prominence of film, radio, television and the various iterations of the published press 
to what was its zenith from the 1960s to the 1980s in many democratically inspired polities. 
Television, as a technology of the social by the 1970s, was at its peak in terms of co-ordinating 
power and structuring attention, and provided a visual leadership and hierarchy of popularity 
and influence across media forms. News anchors and hosts, visible entertainment performers 
across film, television and popular music, and political and cultural leaders were the visible 
television identities that helped organise a stable system of representation, a kind of stability 
that didn’t require deeper negotiation beyond the two hundred or so individuals already part of 
this “network.” 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PRESENTATIONAL MEDIA AND CULTURAL REGIME 
Although still powerful, this representational media and cultural regime has been under 
some threat as many of its key agents and actors have been in transformation. The stability of 
the system of representation that television as its leader had provided began to be undermined 
by the mid-1990s, as the World Wide Web started to have both wider use and quite different 
relationships to the populace. The term “legacy media,” with its apparent first use in 1998 
(Nielsen), captures both its power and its historically contingent configuration of power. On one 
level, legacy media produced the patterns that normalised the personalisation of politics, where 
leaders, like celebrities, were made more significant than either political parties or issues. 
Legacy media were “technologies of the social” (Marshall, Celebrity Persona Pandemic 38-39) in 
their capacity to build collectives as audiences. Simultaneously, these older media forms set up 
legitimising structures that allowed political leaders to lead and to become highly patterned and 
visible political personas as the few mediatised political identities in any polity. 
Online culture from the 1990s began to produce a new “technology of the social” and a 
related reassembling of agency. From the original personal websites which resembled the look 
of powerful media forms via hypertext and integration of images (Wynn and Katz), to the 
development of weblogs that served as a traversal of personal mediatised activity into the 
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twenty-first century (Blood), a challenge to legacy media was emerging. The expansion of 
services such as YouTube, MySpace, Urkut and slightly later Facebook, Twitter and Instagram 
among many others produced new patterns in the movement of information, news and sharing 
(van Dijk). At the centre of this new organisation of media and communication operating as a 
structured intermediary was the individual “user,” to use a parlance from early studies of online 
culture. 
Some Internet researchers in the 1990s and 2000s labelled this as more democratic, if 
not anarchic (Levinson; Cairncross; Benkler). A dominant “cyberlibertarian” ideology, espoused 
by organisations such as The Electronic Freedom Foundation and The Progress and Freedom 
Foundation, proselytised the libertarian quality of the emerging online culture and actively 
worked to avoid constraints, limitations and legalised policies (Bell et al.; Dyson et al.). Out of 
this emerged an odd but powerful information economy that generated several economic 
bubbles. The Internet became a territory for a new capitalist-like enterprise modalised around 
different models of value, but fundamentally organised around two parallel constructs: the 
individual as gatekeeper and the network of connections this individualisation produced as the 
economic generator and multiplier. 
In contrast to the representational media and cultural regime with its legacy media and 
a system of public personalities produced by national and international Leviathans, a 
“presentational media and cultural regime” was in ascendancy. The fundamental component of 
this emerging regime was an extension of the personalisation complex that structured the 
highly systematised network of visible personalities of legacy media and its systems of 
representational legitimacy. Personalisation accelerated in several ways. First there was the 
personalisation of technologies through individualised devices such as personal computers and 
mobile phones. Second, there was the personalisation of the modes of individual activities and 
displays of the self through personal websites and blogs as described above. Third, and more 
profoundly, there was a new layer of personalisation proliferating through an expansive market 
and culture of apps and applications that emerged with, and were related to, social media 
applications that regularised individual participation, visibility, sharing and networking. 
In contrast to a small number of individuals who were initially mediatised (with 
mediatisation the representational culture of images and texts of the famous as they were 
displayed through legacy media), over the last 12 years a system has emerged where billions 
are mediatised. Like their legacy media progenitors, these newly mediatised individuals 
managed their production, distribution and exhibition of themselves, developed something 
resembling audiences of follower and friends, and networked in a cultural world where their 
image, visibility and what they liked both appeared to matter and resembled past and current 
media (for a valuable extension of this, see Senft). 
A massive and complex system has emerged via these technologies that has permitted a 
sense of agency as these billions of networked individuals produce forms of strategic public 
displays of themselves that are designed to move and connect to different collectives. Once 
again, as opposed to the relative stability of legacy media and its limited repertoire of 
recognisable personas and its construction of clearly identifiable and economically validated 
audiences, we now have a pandemic of persona construction. 
This persona construction is a hybrid of forms and mediated speaking positions. 
Although social media sites differ in the way they give prominence to certain kinds of messages 
and posts, there is an emerging pattern where Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Weibo 
resemble each other in overall structure. The posts of microblogs on Twitter and Weibo 
correlate with the news feeds and walls of Facebook and Instagram. Images, still and moving, 
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abound and serve as forms of attention and attraction structures. Collectively, the material from 
the avatar/image that identifies the “source” as an individual to the flow of posts and news 
establishes the online identity of the user and is reinforced by the social engagement of 
perfunctory likes and comments by a network of friends. It is the intersection of the 
interpersonal with the highly mediated that produces a culture of “intercommunication”: users 
are drawn into levels of engagement that are a melange of personal, public, sometimes 
professional, sometimes intimate, and frequently connected to videos, images and other texts 
and comments (Marshall, Celebrity Persona Pandemic 67-75). 
HYBRID MEDIA AND POLITICAL TURBULENCE 
The effect of pandemic persona production and the emergence of a presentational media 
as a cultural regime on politics is generally one of destabilisation. Legacy media and structures 
of political representation are now challenged by a personalised attention economy where a 
layer of mediatised online identities structure the flow of news and the patterns of attachment 
and connection to an electorate. Andrew Chadwick explains that politics now operates in what 
he calls hybrid media—which is neither the traditional legacy media nor the online structures of 
social media, but a movement between these layers in an elaborate game of influence and 
power. Legacy media trawls online culture as a source of breaking news to maintain its 
currency. The wider dimensions of online culture structure odd forms of loose networks of 
connection that are based on hashtags, prominent online personas and further connections to 
political candidates, movements and party leaders. 
The old conception of the personalisation of politics is a threadbare starting point of a 
new generation of personalised politics, where the personal is determined by online posts, 
photos and Tweets that attract emotive attention in a manner perhaps most similar to the 
operation of banner headlines in a tabloid newspaper. The difference from the tabloid 
overblown headline are two distinct levels of the personal. First, the candidate or the politician 
must produce a “feed” that allows it to be both picked up and shared by potential allies, 
constructing a “micro-electorate” (see Usher’s article in this issue). And second, it must generate 
a meme-like series of related posts by millions of interconnected followers who are similarly 
working through these political postures to construct their own public identity with their choice 
of sharing, their structure of added texts, and their relation to their audience of followers and 
friends who may or may not extend the emotional discussion as they also play in their 
construction of mediatised identity or online persona. 
From this perspective of a new, layered personalised politics that works simultaneously 
through online culture and legacy media, let’s look briefly at our two flagged examples—Brexit 
and the 2016 US Presidential Election—to identify this transformed political persona. This is a 
persona that literally struggles to embody the body politic; the Leviathan of the contemporary 
that once was intricately manifested through the close and legitimising relationship between 
politics and the media. 
BREXIT AND THE 2016 US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Recent research from the Oxford Internet Institute has explored how online activities 
have produced what they call “political turbulence” (Margetts et al.). Although their research 
has been more focused on social movements rather than political persona, their approach does 
identify the sometimes-intense activities that individuals produce as a form of online identity 
formation. In their study, the researchers conducted a social experiment where they tried to 
determine the effect of participants’ support for a charity through shaming and visibility of their 
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activities of support. Their experiment, in its replication of online sharing of activity, pointed to 
how revealing the activity of others produced more support for the charity as individuals 
competed with each other for their level of caring (146-7). Their research reveals that online 
culture produces a changed political environment that privileges forms and strategies of higher 
visibility. In addition, their research explores how the usual determination of political activity is 
in flux through the use of social media. Instead of demographics being a predictor of political 
activity, where the richer and the more educated, for instance, are more likely to vote and 
participate, something else is arising—at least in the analysis of social media and politics—as a 
more accurate determination of engagement. Drawing on the five great personality traits 
originally developed in psychology research, Margetts’ team of researchers found that 
personality traits that influence people’s engagement with social media correspond with their 
online-inspired political activity. Specifically, the traits of extraversion and agreeableness match 
their previous research on the significance of visibility, and are instrumental in understanding 
the relationship that social media has with the production of contemporary politics.  
In a follow-up blog that was attempting to explain the United Kingdom 2016 European 
Union Membership Referendum, commonly known as Brexit, Margetts concluded that there was 
a link between Brexit and the US Presidential Election in a visible era of political turbulence, all 
of which was connected to the new organisation of involvement and participation in online 
culture: 
This explosive rise, non-normal distribution and lack of organization that characterizes 
contemporary politics as a chaotic system, can explain why many political mobilizations 
of our times seem to come from nowhere. In the US and the UK it can help to understand 
the shock waves of support that brought Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Jeremy Corbyn 
(elected leader of the Labour party in 2015) and Brexit itself, all of which have 
challenged so strongly traditional political institutions. In both countries, the two largest 
political parties are creaking to breaking point in their efforts to accommodate these 
phenomena. (Margetts) 
Margett et al.’s research is part of a growing body of work that is situating online activity as 
something that is transforming our culture in a variety of ways. If we look a little more closely at 
the statistics of engagement related to Brexit, we can discern that there was massive activity 
online by both the Leave supporters and Stay supporters, even if that activity was done simply 
as “liking” something and thus sharing that “like” with personal networks: basic Facebook likes 
of #StrongerIn were recorded at 568,363 during the campaign, while #VoteLeave generated 
555,030 (Vickers). Online activity is evidence of how many people construct their own personas 
through political events and share those positions and postures with others. This identifies how 
politics via social media is a particular form of expression of the public self for sharing with 
others. Thus, what must be understood about political persona in the contemporary moment is 
that it is not only a construction of political leaders, but also a construction of how the political 
becomes part of all social media users’ personas. 
To augment this analysis, here are some very basic statistics related to who voted in the 
Brexit referendum. This research revealed that as low as 36% of 18-24 year olds voted and the 
next lowest percentage of 56% of 25-34 year olds voted. In addition, less than 13% of 18-24 
year olds actually registered to vote, which produced a massive skewing of referendum results 
to the desires of older Britons: almost 80% those aged 45 years and older voted and so that 
voting age dominated the final results (Vickers). 
Many interpretations can be made from these voting statistics, but what is critical to 
understanding this changed politics is seeing that there is a disconnection between place and 
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online identity that is more evident in the younger age group. Older age groups physically voted 
and were connected to the way that representational systems have operated under the 
representational media and cultural regime. In other words, their identities were grounded in 
where they lived and their everyday lives, which included knowing where to vote within that 
community identity. We would conjecture that younger potential voters, however, were not as 
connected to actual voting, the polling booths and the community organisation of politics that 
has been part of this system of representation for generations. Their politics and the dimensions 
of their “political” persona were done in the performative moments of their public persona 
online. Unfortunately, the representational system of politics does not calibrate that online 
work: it is not voting! 
This disconnection from the representational systems of government and media is 
complex and, as the Brexit referendum reveals, does not capture the entire populace within any 
nation or polity. Politics, like the media, has become hybrid as well. Political election campaigns 
and elections are navigating through old and new forms of connection to their citizenry, with 
varying results. In the American political system, it has been a truism for the last century that 
the key to victory has been getting your supporters to actually vote. Voter turnouts in the United 
States have not been above 60% since 1968 (Statista) and the political game is ensuring that 
likely sympathetic voters to your cause are registered to vote. 
The 2016 Presidential Election in the United States provides some similar connections 
and disconnections with the political and media representational system that we have outlined 
above in interpreting the 2016 Brexit vote in the U.K. What can be seen much more clearly in a 
presidential campaign is how these shifts in online activity and relationship to place are 
articulated in the production of a presidential-level political persona. 
Although there is not the space to present a full analysis of the 2016 Presidential 
Election and the ultimate success of Donald Trump, we want to situate the particular rise of this 
political persona as exemplary of this new era of turbulence where representational structures 
and institutions clash, compete, and sometimes exploit the newer presentational structures that 
are emerging. The former stability of the representational Leviathan that was dependent on a 
legacy media system to legitimise its power and presence is breaking down. 
First of all, Trump’s status as a highly visible public persona in the United States has 
been dependent on the patterns of the representational media and cultural regime for very 
close to 40 years. Attached and related to his designed-to-be-prominent real estate 
development business, Trump made concerted efforts to be on national television with 
regularity. From television commercials promoting products such as Pizza Hut and McDonald’s, 
to other marketing efforts promoting his own products and others, Trump sold his own 
“success” as a persona. His ability to express a brash billionaire by the 1990s led to a series of 
scenes in popular film and television, including appearances on American situation comedies 
The Nanny, The Fresh Prince of Bel Air, and Spin City, along with film cameos in such films as 
Home Alone 2 (Weisman). Invariably, Trump played himself or on occasion, an acting 
personality that resembled his public identity. He also bought into programs and franchises that 
were televisual, with his Miss America Pageant perhaps being the most prominent. In the 2000s, 
Trump starred for eleven years as the boss in the reality show The Apprentice (2004-2015) 
where once again he played his own construction of a business tycoon making rash and quick 
decisions for the benefit of apparent profits. 
The effect of this media work was two-fold. In its consistency and seriality (Marshall, 
Celebrity Persona Pandemic 48-63) across performances and public appearances, it constructed 
Trump as a character whose performative dimensions were over-coded and stereotyped. It also 
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constructed a somewhat unlikeable, unscrupulous, but opinionated individual who had 
achieved his right to the public stage through his wealth. Trump was, and is, a persona that was 
highly dependent on how legacy media has operated (for more, see Andrejevic). From those 
constructions and his own extensive work on making a public image that was an extension of 
his “work,” there is no question that Trump’s was, and is, a celebrity. As opposed to constructing 
a political biography, Trump’s business autobiography The Art of the Deal has served to 
establish how his business acumen represents his public skill and, by implication, his political 
value, but also exemplified his persona of political destabilisation in its disconnection from 
established political practice. 
Hillary Clinton’s constitution of a public persona was predominantly derived from 
various fora into politics. The many political biographies about her (for example, David Brock’s 
1996 The Seduction of Hillary Rodham) and her own autobiographies (Living History and Hard 
Choices, published in 2004 and 2014 respectively) establish her as a political persona, and the 
prominence of her positions—particularly as Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013 under 
President Obama, US Senator from New York from 2001 to 2009, and her 2008 presidential 
candidacy—further accentuate this particular public identity. However, because of her status as 
the wife of Bill Clinton, US President from 1993 to 2001, this identity was somewhat conflicted 
by its identification with her role as “First Lady”—a quasi-official position that she politicised 
further during her tenure. As First Lady, along with her previous role as Governor’s spouse 
when Bill Clinton was Governor of Arkansas before being elected President, her identity became 
somewhat connected to a celebrity-like figure with its prominence and with the effects of the 
1992 and 1996 sex scandals. Nonetheless, for over 40 years Hillary Clinton established herself 
as part of the political elite and establishment within the Democratic Party, as well as a visible 
champion of women’s rights and universal health care. From the perspective of legacy media 
and legacy politics, Hillary Clinton embodied a legacy politician status during her 2016 
presidential candidacy, a kind of status that allowed her to legitimately embody a potential 
representational media and cultural regime Leviathan.  
Donald Trump’s ultimate victory over Clinton was remarkable for many reasons. First of 
all, although Trump derived much of his symbolic power from his prominence in legacy media, 
his particular migration into politics was not twinned with the representational political 
institutions in any way. For instance, he had never held political office or had a public service 
position in his career, something that made him historically unique once he had successfully 
become the nominee of the Republican Party. And, as he pursued his presidential candidacy 
through the Republican primaries, he progressively situated himself as an outsider related to 
legacy news media. By Election Day, six papers (all of them from small or regional markets) had 
endorsed Trump, in comparison to 200 for Clinton and a further 12 or more endorsing what 
could be called “not-Trump” (Arrieta-Kenna). Although endorsements by newspapers are not 
generally thought of as politically-determining in terms of outcomes, this was the lowest by far 
for any major-party presidential candidate in history and did identify a disconnection from the 
news media (Arrieta-Kenna). When one considers how Trump first alienated conservative 
television news media such as Fox News, the more centrist services such CNN, CNBC and the 
major national network news, and even most of the major coverage that looked at his 
presidential campaign from an entertainment/celebrity perspective, one can see that, at least 
strategically, what he presented was definitively not embraced by legacy media. 
This disconnection from legacy media and legacy politics would in the recent past have 
determined the illegitimacy of Trump’s candidacy even as it surfaced. However, as we identified 
in the Brexit example, something different is occurring in the organisation of politics that is 
producing different effects and outcomes. Trump’s ascendancy is difficult to read, partially 
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because of the structure of media coverage which was conveyed via a nearly wholesale official 
rejection of the candidate, but more directly because of the way that the new “attention 
economy” now operates and moves through contemporary culture. Over the past eight years 
there has been a gradual migration of the production of attention—what we could call “media” 
attention through the broadest definition of media—via online forms and social media (Crogan 
and Kinsley). The different nature of this attention economy is the new intersections between 
the public, private and intimate that are promulgated in a world where individuals reveal 
themselves collectively, share those revelations and network with others in different 
constellations of public and publicity structures. Once again, this massive presentation of the 
self—a pandemic of individual persona construction for use in this online world—is 
instrumental for making sense of the movement of information, value and reputation in the 
contemporary attention economy.  
Regarding the 2016 US presidential election, Donald Trump managed to shift the flow of 
public debate, whether in legacy media platforms or newer social media, through provocative 
posts and Tweets on different platforms that he also replicated in his public addresses. His 
extreme attacks on Hillary Clinton and other candidates often focused on very personal 
dimensions of these individuals, his persistent racist characterisations and his openly 
aggressive identifications of a need for a new American relationship to the world served as both 
click-bait for social media users and were too alluring as headlines for legacy news media 
coverage to not use as leading stories. In other words, for sixteen months prior to Election Day 
Donald Trump dominated the attention economy to a point where legacy news media followed 
him “live” to capture the possibility that something newly provocative would emerge from his 
mouth at any time, and they would fulfil their desired status to take the lead in routing what was 
said through the attention economy. 
Central to this remarkable cultural dominance of attention was Trump’s peculiar ability 
to move the social media culture of personal revelation as a form of attraction in politics itself. 
His signature persona performance was to cross the lines of public and social etiquette 
repeatedly and with force never seen in public political performance. That challenge to public 
identity was oddly but persistently elemental to social media and individual persona 
construction online: Trump converted that affective attention economy of the personal and the 
private into contemporary politics and drew legacy news media to expansively participate in its 
conversion into a legitimate and now prominently visible form of contemporary politics.  
Interpreting the actual result of this election from this perspective of political persona is 
even more fraught. Trump produced an extreme form of strategic public identity, built from his 
business man/art-of-the-deal celebrity persona but fundamentally organised to draw attention 
and congeal that attention around discontent. Legacy politics and its associated legacy media 
fell into a hybrid media structure and a dependence on this sensational persona, possibly with 
the hope of delegitimising the truth-claims of this Trump political persona. However, the 
instability that Trump generated may have been all that a disenfranchised populace was looking 
for: not some claim to authenticity, not some form of truth, but the sheer need for political 
turbulence in and of itself. With Clinton over-coded as the legacy politician, a persona with the 
quintessential embodiment of elite thinking and action (and who had already eliminated the 
left’s Trump persona doppelganger in the equally interesting persona of Bernie Sanders) 
Trump’s persona inhabited this territory with little challenge. 
Our use of political persona and, more widely, persona to understand contemporary 
politics identifies pointedly how this changed cultural landscape needs the work of Persona 
Studies. Persona is a fictive public identity drawn from elements of one’s individuality but 
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designed for public use. We made the claim near the beginning of this introductory article that 
the massive mediatisation of the self has produced this new political instability, this era of 
persona generation, that challenges the organisation of citizenry as voters as much as it 
challenges those trying to represent the citizenry in the representational system. Like Brexit, 
one of the other transformations is a disconnection of some citizens from place as their online 
identity, and the massive active work that goes into producing a shared persona, produces a 
different and not necessarily geographically-defined identity.  
There are many reasons why political experts and polling mis-predicted the results of 
the 2016 Presidential Election, but I think it is worthwhile to conjecture one further claim that 
has emerged from this destabilised mediatised system. We would claim that the presentational 
media and cultural regime does produce an active participant in debate—a very lively, sharing 
and networked pervasive political persona—but not necessarily active in the representational 
systems of government. Actual voting in its geographical and community specificity of polling 
booths is part of legacy politics and somewhat disconnected from this emerging presentational 
media and cultural regime. The disenfranchised individuals that have been identified as the 
Trump supporters are just slightly more likely to be in particular communities and not part of 
the disconnected online culture that is displaced from where they live. The attention economy 
produced the persona that aligned with this disenfranchised but more-likely-to-vote citizen 
because of their legacy-like cultural connection to place.  
In the current cultural moment, the relationship between the individual and the 
collective is in turbulence. In terms of political persona, the fictive quality of political public 
identity can be traced via the transformation of the media-cultural regime that supports it. From 
Callon and Latour’s Actor-Network Theory-informed reading of Hobbes’ Leviathan, the political 
moments of Brexit and Trump’s election expose the contingency of the political apparatus of the 
Western liberal-democratic state—the representational “Leviathan”—and of tracing how the 
work of supporting and legitimising this representational “Leviathan” is being both challenged 
and co-opted. Thus, the democratic Leviathan is exposed in the new politics via the new political 
personas. The revelation of the fictive quality of political public identity is also exposed. The 
way that democratic politics absorbs the agency of many into a singular entity/persona as 
president is also made visible. From an Actor Network Theory approach, the current election 
exposed the sociality of agency and the instability of the Leviathan, as well as the apparatuses of 
governing and the technologies that have supported its structure. 
JOURNAL ARTICLE SUMMARIES 
In this special issue of Persona Studies, we have published five articles that use political 
persona to engage with these issues of confrontation, co-optation and transformation. Many of 
the articles focus on moments of instability or conflict within existing political orders, and how 
political persona can help elucidate those moments. Each in their own way traces the trajectory 
of a political persona (or personas) in a contemporary cultural and political environment. Our 
contributors have considered a US president and president-elect, British parliamentary 
candidates, a politician and women’s rights activist in Botswana, a paparazzi turned mayor of an 
Australian regional city, and a Polish rock musician turned national politician. Together, they 
trace the diversity of strategies and challenges around the operation of political persona today. 
Usher empirically examines the strategic operation of U.K. leaders’ political personas 
during the 2013 British election. Extending and reorienting the term “micropublics” (Marshall, 
“Mapping”), she highlights how the leaders of the main U.K. political parties used Twitter and 
Facebook to construct microelectorates. The variations in these political leaders’ construction of 
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persona online suggest new and alternative means of attracting democratic participation, if not 
necessarily in-depth engagement, in a presentational media and cultural regime. Played out on 
Facebook and Twitter, these members of the established political parties each have carved out a 
niche for themselves within the structures required of them on newer media platforms.  
While Usher’s investigation shows how established political players can maintain 
continuity of political power in the new regime, others who have transferred status between 
cultural regimes have not so much transferred political power as translated their old celebrity 
status into a new political one. We have already mentioned Trump’s rise to fame through legacy 
media. However, he is not the only beneficiary of prominence in the representational regime 
who has then translated that prominence into a political career. Two articles published in this 
issue engage in case studies of a celebrity-turned-politician and the difficulties that arose from 
conflicts between celebrity persona and the expectations of traditional political display. Notably 
both celebrity politicians examined, despite numerous differences in nationality, reasons for 
celebrity status, and even the level of politics in which they were involved, shared the common 
denominator of relying very heavily on social media rather than legacy media to present their 
political persona.  
Casson investigates a celebrity-turned-politician at the level of local Australian 
government. Her case study is Darryn Lyons, the former mayor of Geelong, a large regional town 
in Victoria, Australia. She focuses on the framing in newspaper reporting and in online 
commentary of Lyons wearing a provocative t-shirt at an event he attended in his role as mayor. 
The apparent contradictions between the persona of celebrity and mayor do not appear to have 
been adequately resolved in this case, which has raised questions about the very process of 
mayoral election in the State of Victoria. 
Olczyk and Wasilewski analyse the media presentations, both on television and on 
Facebook, of Polish rock star-turned-national-politician Pawel Kukiz. His engagement on 
Facebook, his political platform of change/risk in stark contrast to the mainstream political 
parties’ emphasis on stability and security, and his dynamic performance on talk shows and 
televised debates, situated him as an explicit alternative to the political status quo. However, 
Olczyk and Wasilewski also point out the difficulties that such appeals to authenticity face when 
confronted with the requirements of existing political structures. 
The question of conflict between authenticity and political structure looms large in Seru 
and Magogwe’s contribution as well. Here, the division between role and persona, authentic 
presentation and artificial seeming, official position and actual intention, is examined in the 
conflict between the male-dominated politics of Botswana and prominent female member of 
Botswana and prominent female member of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Margaret 
Nasha. While the BDP ostensibly supported gender equality, Seru and Magogwe use Nasha’s 
experience within the party to show the contrast between the public face and the private 
actions of BDP members. 
Although we have already discussed Trump ourselves, there is no doubt that further 
evaluation of the “Trump phenomenon” will be forthcoming in the coming months and years. 
Rademacher’s article in this issue offers a unique take on Trump’s persona. She offers an 
analysis of the resurgent genre of “noir” to illustrate the conventions utilised by both Trump 
himself and by the legacy media in the mediated presentation of a political persona. That 
persona, of the “hard-boiled detective,” situates a particular, and a particularly American, 
mythology about success and power very uneasily in the current political context of America 
and Trump himself. 
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As we look forwards toward President Trump, we should not forget to look back on the 
persona of President Obama. Totman and Hardy query US President Obama’s political legacy, 
interrogating the relationship between his political persona and actual attempts to implement 
his foreign policy in the Middle East. They find little to support the early popular interpretation 
of Obama as a “man of peace,” and argue that his image even now stands in contrast to his 
political agenda. They also find that his various successes and failures have not significantly 
impacted his domestic popularity, and suggest that, at least for the moment, foreign policy in the 
Middle East does not play a strong part in either the production or the reception of the political 
persona of the US President. 
CONCLUSION 
As we stated at the outset of this introduction, persona—the negotiated construction of 
the individual in their interactions with the collective—is imbued with politics at its core. 
However, the means by which some individuals make a claim to explicit, legitimate political 
authority over others, and the means by which these claims are accepted, is the distinct domain 
of political persona investigated in this special issue. Existing research into political persona has 
demonstrated the wide range of matters to which political persona has relevance, from issues of 
authenticity and image, to issues of managing and making use of emotional presentations and 
connections. Brexit and Trump’s triumph suggest that many of the assumptions around how 
politics and political persona work must now be questioned.  
With the apparent stability and naturalness of the political order in the representational 
media and cultural regime disrupted, and political power personalised in the new 
presentational regime, new negotiations of the relationship between individual and collective 
agency are underway. The study of persona is ideally positioned to examine questions of 
collective agency and political power that have been raised by the new vulnerability of these 
once seemingly unassailable Leviathans, as we, and they, enter new and unfamiliar political 
territory, armed—so far—only with the tools that have served us in the old. We hope that, at the 
very least, this special issue of Persona Studies will go some way to drawing up the map. 
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